Overview
The cookie jar was full of cookies this morning. Phil checks the jar in the afternoon and the cookies are gone. He thinks that stealing the cookies is just the sort of thing Angelica would do. He consults Lil. They start to deliberate: (Cookies) 1 Lil: Let's see what we think. Who stole the cookies?
Phil: Well, Angelica might be the thief.
1
In this paper I give conversations parenthetical names, and I use italics for substantive claims.
Consider the sentence that Phil utters:
(1) Angelica might be the thief.
I shall call (1) an epistemic 'might'-sentence.
Here is the question this paper will explore: What is Phil doing when he utters (1)? And in general, what are speakers typically doing when they utter epistemic 'might'-sentences? I will
show that an initially attractive answer to this general question cannot be right. It is important to note that this is a question about the pragmatics of uses of 'might'-sentences, not a question about the semantics of these sentences. So, by showing that one attractive sort of answer cannot be right, I am not showing that any particular view of the semantics of 'might'-sentences is incorrect.
There has been less discussion of the pragmatics of 'might'-sentences than of their semantics.
This paper aims to display the importance of giving a pragmatic theory by offering a problem for a natural set of such theories. 2 Our guiding question, again, is what are speakers typically doing when they utter epistemic 'might'-sentences. We will be helped in answering this question by contrasting (Cookies) with the following conversation. Tommy and Chuckie are also investigating the cookie theft. They have some evidence that suggests that Susie is the thief and some that suggests that Stu is the thief. They have no evidence that suggests that Angelica is the thief. So, Angelica is not a serious suspect in their search, though they can't decisively prove that she isn't the thief. They have the following conversation:
(If Cookies) Tommy: Susie and Stu are serious suspects. But, given our information, we shouldn't now consider Angelica a serious suspect.
2
I suspect that an account of the pragmatics of 'might'-sentences is also the place to look for solutions to some of the extant popular puzzles in the epistemic modal literature -for instance, the puzzles in Egan, Hawthorne, & Weatherson [2005] and Yalcin [2007] -as these are fundamentally puzzles about the uses of epistemic terms. I say a bit more about these issues in footnote 31, but they are, for the most part, outside the scope of this paper.
bringing her world-famous chili. In this situation, it is appropriate to utter (4) and it is not appropriate to utter (3). All of this is rather mundane. What is interesting is that this mundane sort of explanation cannot, given a natural theory about the pragmatics of uses of 'might'-sentences, be transferred over to explain why we can, in some cases, appropriately utter (2) but not (1) (for example in the situation surrounding (If Cookies) ). This makes the theory inconsistent with the data that we can, sometimes, appropriately use conditional 'might'-sentences and not the corresponding simple 'might '-sentences. 4 In this paper I will show how this theory of the pragmatics of uses of 'might'-sentences leads to the false prediction that it is always at least as appropriate to utter a simple 'might'-sentence as the corresponding conditional 'might'-sentence. This will allow us to see what we need to do to avoid the false prediction. I will conclude by presenting an alternative account of the pragmatics of uses of 'might'-sentences -one which allows us to co-opt the simple explanation just given.
The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might'
First, I want to characterize the position that I will be arguing against. It is inspired by modal logic. A common interpretation of modal logic treats possibility modals as existential quantifiers over possible worlds (which are just possible ways the world could be). So, letting P be a possibility modal and q be a non-modal sentence, we get that Pq is true if and only if q is true in some relevant possible world. Likewise with necessity modals. They are universal quantifiers over possible worlds. Many semanticists attempt to interpret natural language modals -like 'might' 4 For a conditional 'might'-sentence, the corresponding simple 'might'-sentence is just the consequent of the conditional. For a simple 'might'-sentence, a corresponding conditional 'might'-sentence is any conditional which has the simple 'might'-sentence as a consequent.
and 'must' -in similar ways. Here, different flavors of modality correspond to differences in the possible worlds that are relevant. For example, for deontic modals, the possible worlds that are relevant are those that are best according to some set of rules. For epistemic modals, the relevant possible worlds are the ones in which all of propositions that make up some body of information are true. 5, 6 These semanticists characterize the epistemic 'might' as a possibility modal that quantifies over these worlds.
Remember that we are interested in giving a theory of the pragmatics of uses of 'might'-sentences. So, our next step is to say what an assertive use of a 'might'-sentence does in conversation. A natural suggestion is that it checks to make sure that the prejacent is consistent with the information of the context (a quick definition: when a 'might'-sentence is in the form, ┌ It might be that S ┐ , the sentence that is substituted for S is called the 'prejacent' 7 ). Such a use, then, looks at the relevant possible worlds and checks if its prejacent is true in any of them. Remember that we are focusing on the epistemic 'might' and the relevant possible worlds are determined by the information relevant in the context. So, checking for a relevant possible world in which the prejacent is true is equivalent to checking whether the prejacent is a priori consistent with the relevant information. Here is a more precise characterization:
The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might': Suppose p is the content of S in a context. Then the communicative impact of an assertive utterance of ┌ It might be that S ┐ at that context is a check of whether p is consistent with the relevant information in the context. If it is, nothing 5 I take a body of information to be a set of propositions. In many cases, these will be the propositions a person or group knows. A body of information can be (partially) characterized by the set of possible worlds in which all of the propositions in the body of information are true.
6
We may want to begin not with metaphysically possible worlds, but with some wider class -perhaps epistemically possible worlds. See Soames [2006] and Chalmers [2011] for more on this, and Braun [2012] for the claim that we should start with worlds that are possible simpliciter. These issues make no difference with respect to the problem I raise.
7
The prejacent is, strictly speaking, a sentence. But, for readability, I sometimes use the word 'prejacent' to talk about what is really the content of the prejacent -a proposition.
We need not accept a general view about what the information of the context is. All that it important in generating the problem is that epistemic modals and conditionals both (at least in most cases) relate to the same body of information. And this is something we need to accept for independent reasons. Here are von Fintel and Gillies [2007, 59] (this assumes a corresponding checking theory of must, where it checks whether a proposition is entailed by the information of the context): Suppose we have lost our marbles. We have found all of them but two -the red one and the blue oneand know that exactly one of them is in the box. Thus: a. The marble in the box might be red. And it might be blue. b. If it's not red, it must be blue. c. If it's not blue, it must be red. In order to get these three sentences to all be true at once there has to be some interaction between the if-clauses and the set of worlds that the modals act as (quantificational) tests on. Otherwise we get inconsistency. I will say more about the interaction between modals and conditionals in section 4. 9 Presumably, they will do this by making their own presuppositions explicit and seeing why it falsely seemed to Phil that it was consistent with the information of the context that Angelica is the thief. Gillies [2007] ) model semantic values as functions from bodies of information to bodies of information -and they model the semantic value of a 'might'-sentence as a function that checks for the consistency of the prejacent with the relevant information. This semantic picture, together with the general pragmatic rule which says that a communicative impact of an utterance of an expression is the application of its semantic value to the information, yields a consistency check as a pragmatic upshot of an utterance. 10 Expressivists, like Yalcin [2007 Yalcin [ , 2011 , also think that an assertive utterance of a 'might'-sentence performs a consistency check (though the connection between Yalcin's semantics and this pragmatics is not dictated by general rules in the way it is for dynamic semantics). 11 In section 7, I will revisit the relationship between these views and The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might' -arguing that they must incorporate some further pragmatic effect to avoid falling prey to the problem of The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might'.
I'll also argue there that contextualists about 'might' can become committed to The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might' if they accept some pragmatic theses. Thus, all of these theorists of the semantics of 'might' should be sensitive to the pragmatic issues involving 'might'-sentences. A natural way to do so is by following the general strategy I suggest in section 8.
It is important to note that both the consistency part and the checking part of The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might' matter in the argument that follows. What follows does not constitute an argument against the position that the communicative impact of an assertive utterance of a 'might'-sentence is conveying some propositional content about what is consistent with the information of the context. 12 I'm also not arguing against the position that the communicative impact of an assertive utterance of a 'might'-sentence is the performance of some other, non-consistency sort of check (for instance, a check that the probability of the prejacent is above some threshold). Rather, my argument is against The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might'. Now that we have an understanding of The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might', I want to give a preview of what will happen in the rest of the paper. The goal of the first part of this paper -sections 3-5 -is to show that The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might' is false. I show how this theory, together with a plausible framework of a view about conditional 'might'-sentences, makes the false prediction that in all cases, it is at least as appropriate to utter a simple 'might'-sentence as it is to utter the corresponding conditional 'might'-sentence. I suggest we should, to avoid this prediction, reject The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might'. If The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might' struck you as a particularly strong generalization about the pragmatics of 'might'-communication, you may not find it surprising that we need to reject it. But in section 6, I strengthen this result, by showing how to reconstruct our problem with a much weaker thesis.
The goal of the second part of the paper -sections 7 and 8 -is to diagnose what has gone wrong. I suggest that the primary upshot of a typical utterance of a 'might'-sentence is to convey that the prejacent is a serious option in reasoning and deliberation. And, for conditional 'might'-sentences, the primary upshot is to convey that the prejacent is a serious option on some supposition. So, the primary communicative upshot of Phil's utterance of (1) in (Cookies) is to convey that it is a serious option in reasoning and deliberation that Angelica is the thief. Besides being extremely plausible, this view has the virtue that, when we accept it instead of The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might', we avoid the problem set out in the first half of the paper.
accepting The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might'.
Inquiry
Before getting to our other assumption -about conditionals -I'll introduce a way of modeling conversational inquiry based on Stalnaker [1970 Stalnaker [ , 1978 . This will give us a framework for clearly seeing the problem.
We begin by considering the set of all of the possible ways the world could be -the set of possible worlds, for short. When agents engage in inquiry, their information usually entails that the world is not, in fact, some of these ways -that is, it entails that some possible worlds are not One can affect the information of the inquirers -and so affect the context set -by making conversational contributions. A conversational contribution will often narrow the context set by ruling out all the possible worlds in that set which are not the way the contribution says the universe is. The point of inquiry is to figure out how the universe is -which possible world is actual -or how the universe is in some respect or other -which class of possible worlds contains candidates for being actual. We do this by narrowing the context set to include only the actual world or only a class of possible worlds.
13 I am intentionally avoiding Stalnaker's notion of common ground here, in favor of the more liberal notion of a group's information (or the information of the context of the inquiry). This information may sometimes be the common presuppositions of the inquirers or conversational participants (as Stalnaker suggests), but it may also be the information distributed among the members of the group or the information of a member of the group who is the authority or representative for the group in that context (to name a couple of options). I find it plausible that in some contexts these are the relevant bodies of information for inquiry, so I use the broader notion of the information of the context to allow this. Nonetheless, my formulation is neutral and could accept that common presuppositions are what matter in every context. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging a more liberal conception of the relevant information than the common ground. In this section I will give such a principle. In order for the principle to be generally attractive, we need to restrict it to a subset of the total possible utterances of a conditional 'might'-sentence. In particular, this principle will only deal with utterances of a conditional 'might'-sentence in a conversation in which the antecedent of the conditional is an open possibility. Before stating the principle, I want to argue that this restriction does not affect our purposes.
Consider the cases that our principle about conditional 'might'-sentences will ignore.
These are cases where the antecedent of the conditional is not an epistemic possibility. But it is typically not appropriate for a speaker to utter an indicative conditional whose antecedent she takes to be epistemically impossible. As Stalnaker [1975, 277] says, "It is appropriate to make an indicative conditional statement or supposition only in a context which is compatible with the antecedent." For example, consider again the conditional:
(4) If Susie comes, she will bring her world-famous chili.
If we know that Susie will not come, it is not appropriate to utter (4). In general, in cases where a speaker knows that the antecedent of an indicative conditional is false, it isn't appropriate for her to utter the conditional (in such cases the speaker could, instead, use a counterfactual conditional). 14 Because the situation surrounding (If Cookies) is one in which it is an open epistemic possibility that Angelica has crumbs in her pocket, our principle only needs to deal with the communicative impact of a conditional 'might'-sentence in such a scenario. This makes the task of giving our principle considerably easier. Just as with The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might', the following principle is not a particular theory of conditional 'might'-sentences, but is an 14 There is at least one non-typical sort of scenario in which it is acceptable to utter an indicative conditional whose antecedent the speaker knows to be false. This is in cases of echoing uses in verbally producing reasoning, starting with a conditional premise that all accept: (5) True, if Susie comes, she will bring her world-famous chili. But I know she won't come. So we cannot rely on her chili as the main course. Chuckie's use of (2) 
umbrella thesis that different sorts of theories may accept:
Conditional 'Might'-Sentences: In situations in which the antecedent is an epistemic possibility, assertively uttering a conditional 'might'-sentence has the effect of assertively uttering the consequent on the supposition that the antecedent is true.
There are two (related) types of theories of conditionals that fit well with Conditional 'Might'-
Sentences.
The first is the dynamic or expressivist version of the modal restrictor-inspired account of indicative conditionals -given by Willer [2011] and Yalcin [2007] . 15 These theorists view the antecedent of a conditional as a restrictor on a modal consequent. 16 This means that when a conditional is assertively uttered, we take the context set and consider only the worlds in which the antecedent is true. A consequent that is not a modal sentence is treated like a 'must'-sentence. So we treat the conditional like we would an assertion of a 'must'-sentence in the restricted context set. In the case of conditional 'might'-sentences, the modal in the consequent is an explicit 'might'. And so, by supposing that the antecedent is true, we restrict the possibilities on which 'might' operates. In the case where the antecedent is epistemically possible, this restricted set of possibilities is always non-empty. The effect of an assertive utterance of a conditional 'might'-sentence in such a case is the effect of an assertive utterance of the corresponding simple 'might'-sentence given that restricted set of possibilities.
Conditional 'Might'-Sentences is also closely related to the views of Edgington [1995] , DeRose and Grandy [1999] , 17 Bennett [2003] , and Barnett [2006] . The idea behind these views is that accepting a conditional involves accepting the consequent on the supposition that the antecedent is true. And assertively uttering a conditional has the effect of assertively uttering the consequent on the supposition that the antecedent is true. Conditional 'Might'-Sentences is a special case of this. 
Sentences
We are now in a position to see that the explanation of why we can sometimes utter 17 DeRose and Grandy think that conditional antecedents are markers of conditional assertions. They think there are (at least) two reasons to make a conditional assertion -that one is not in an epistemic position to assert the consequent and that one does not know that the consequent is relevant. Their view agrees with the suppositional view when conditional assertions are made for the former, but not the latter, reason. And these are the sort of cases we are concerned with here. 18 Whether Stalnaker [1975] accepts Conditional 'Might'-Sentences depends on whether he agrees that context sets are Well-Behaved, in the sense discussed in note 15. I won't engage in the necessary Stalnaker exegesis needed to answer this question here.
ordinary, non-modal conditional sentences rather than their simple counterparts doesn't extend to conditional and simple 'might'-sentences. One should utter a non-modal conditional sentence only in cases where one is not in an epistemic position to utter the consequent. But, given our assumptions, whenever one is in a position to utter a conditional 'might'-sentence, one is also in a position to utter its consequent.
Let's start with our example of ordinary, non-modal conditional sentences. Consider again:
(3) Susie will bring her world-famous chili.
It is appropriate to utter (4) in some situations. These are situations in which a speaker has adequate evidence that Susie will bring her world-famous chili if she comes but does not have adequate evidence that she will bring her world famous chili (since she may reasonably doubt that Susie will come). Since we shouldn't say things for which we lack adequate evidence, ala Grice's [1989] second maxim of Quality, a speaker should utter (4) and not (3) in such situations. This is a simple explanation for why, sometimes, we should utter (4) and not (3).
Unfortunately, this explanation doesn't extend to the case of 'might'-sentences. Consider again:
(2) If Angelica has crumbs in her pocket, then she might be the thief.
The problem is that, given our assumptions, any situation in which a speaker has adequate evidence to utter (2) is a situation in which she has adequate evidence to utter (1). That is, unlike in the non-modal case, if a speaker is in a position to utter a conditional 'might'-sentence, she is also in a position to utter its consequent. In what follows I'll show this with the example of (2) and (1), but the result is general.
Consider a scenario in which a speaker is in a position to utter (2). According to
Conditional 'Might'-Sentences, an utterance of (2) has the same communicative impact as an utterance of (1) on the supposition that Angelica has crumbs in her pocket. So, assume that C is the context set of our conversation and C-is the largest subset of C containing only worlds in which Angelica has crumbs in her pocket. Then an utterance of (2) in a conversation in which C is the context set has the effect of an utterance of (1) in a conversation in which C-is the context set. By The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might' the communicative impact of an utterance of (1) in a context with C-as context set, is a check of whether there is a world in C-where Angelica is the thief. A speaker is in a position to utter (2) when she knows that this check of C-will succeed, i.e.
when she knows C-contains a world in which Angelica is the thief. Let's assume that our speaker is in such a position.
Here, then, is the problem. Any speaker who knows that C-contains a world in which Angelica is the thief is in a position to know that C contains a world in which Angelica is the thief (since C-, a subset of C, contains such a world). Since she is in such a position, C is the context set, and she is aiming to say something about what body of information the proposition that Angelica is the thief is consistent with, she is, I assume, irrational if she does not come to know this. Let's assume our agent is not irrational and that she knows that C contains a world in which Angelica is the thief. Then, given The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might', she is in a position to utter sentence (1). This is because, given that theory, the communicative impact of an utterance of (1) is a check of whether C contains any worlds in which Angelica is the thief. And, given that she knows C does contain such a world, she knows that this check will succeed. Thus, she is in a position to utter (1).
What this shows, then, is that any rational speaker who is in an epistemic position to utter (2) is in a position to utter (1). Since the choice of (1) and (2) was arbitrary, any rational speaker who is in a position to utter a conditional 'might'-sentence is in a position to utter its consequent.
Because of this, we can't explain the cases where uttering a conditional but not a simple sentence is appropriate in the modal case in the same way that we can explain it in the non-modal case.
In the modal case, our assumptions predict that it is at least as appropriate to utter the simple as the conditional 'might '-sentence. 19 This is problematic, since there are scenarios -like the one in which Tommy and Chuckie find themselves -where it is appropriate to utter (2) but not (1).
We confronted this problematic result by assuming The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might'
and Conditional 'Might'-Sentences. I won't argue for Conditional 'Might'-Sentences. But I will remind the reader that it is plausible and is closely related to multiple popular theories of conditionals.
So, I will assume that it is true for the remainder of this paper. 20 I will suggest, therefore, that we need to reject The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might'. In section 8, I will propose a replacement theory on which the explanation of why it is sometimes more appropriate to utter a conditional 'might'-sentence than a simple one mirrors the explanation outlined above for the non-modal case. Before doing this, I will, in the next section, briefly show that we actually need to reject a weaker assumption than The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might'. And in the following section, I
will pinpoint the flaw of The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might' and discuss its relationship to a number of views of the semantics of 'might'.
Weakening the Assumption
19 Strictly speaking, I have shown that, given The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might', Conditional 'Might'-Sentences, and Grice's second maxim of Quality -"Don't say that for which you lack adequate evidence" [1989, 27] -we cannot explain why sometimes a conditional, but not its corresponding simple 'might'-sentence is appropriate. But there is actually a stronger result than this. We cannot explain this even with the help of all of Grice's maxims [1989] . None of his maxims -Quality, Quantity, Relation, or Manner -give a reason for uttering the conditional rather than the simple 'might'-sentence. It is relatively straightforward, on some reflection about each maxim and submaxim, why this is so, and I leave this exercise to the reader. 20 I don't mean to imply that there are no prima facie plausible ways of avoiding the puzzle by rejecting Conditional 'Might'-Sentences. But an investigation of these responses is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I want to suggest my own diagnosis of the puzzle in order to sketch a plausible theory that avoids it. However, a false prediction about a single case follows from a considerably weaker assumption than the one that all instances of The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might' are true. We were able to derive the false prediction by considering a single case involving possible uses of sentences (1) and (2). And so, the problematic result follows just from thinking that The Consistency
Checking Theory of 'Might' is true not for all substitution instances, but only for those involving (1) and (2) in contexts like those surrounding (If Cookies). This is a much weaker thesis.
More generally, we can generate a problem if there is a simple 'might'-sentence and a corresponding conditional 'might'-sentence for which the following two conditions hold: (i) there is a context in which it is appropriate to utter the conditional sentence and not the simple one and (ii) the substitution instances of The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might' for both sentences are true with respect to that context. We get a problem because, given (ii), our theory will predict that it is at least as appropriate to utter the simple 'might'-sentence as it is to utter the corresponding conditional in that context, contra (i).
It is easy to find simple and conditional 'might'-sentences to satisfy condition (i) (think of (If Cookies)). And (ii) is a pretty minimal requirement. Denying (ii) requires a rather strong (though true) thesis -that every simple and corresponding conditional 'might'-sentence pair that satisfies (i) is such that either the simple sentence, the conditional, or both have some different or more forceful communicative impact than simply checking for consistency with the context set.
This suggests that those who think of consistency checks as the main part of the story of 'might'-communication can't be right. The story must include some more robust communicative impact.
In Realizing the importance of this project -and not disproving any particular semantic theory -is the real upshot of the problem I've presented.
Nonetheless, let's see how The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might' relates to some views in the literature. An obvious way to view The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might' is as the theory of the pragmatics of 'might' for dynamic semantics, as advocated by Veltman [1996] and discussed by von Fintel and Gillies [2007] . The idea behind the dynamic semantic account is that the semantic value of a 'might'-sentence is an update rule on the information of the context. It checks whether the prejacent is consistent with the information -returning that information if it is and returning the defective body of information if it is not. This, together with a general pragmatic rule which says that uttering a sentence results in applying that sentence's semantic value (function) to the information of the context, predicts that an assertive utterance of a 'might'-sentence will perform such a check. If an account says that this is the only communicative function of a use of a 'might'-sentence, then it is committed to The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might'. So, the problem I've presented shows that it is important for dynamic semanticists to accept that there is some further communicative impact of an utterance of a 'might'-sentence than just a consistency check. 21 And the weakening of the assumption in the last section shows that they must accept this further communicative impact in a wide range of cases.
The same sort of update rule is also the basis for Seth Yalcin's [2007 Yalcin's [ , 2011 in his picture that could be used to cash out this function -for instance, he could say that an utterance of a 'might'-sentence suggests that the conversational participants become sensitive to the question of whether the prejacent is true (where his account already accepts question-sensitive belief states).
Again, it is important to note that it is open to dynamic semanticists and expressivists to
21 In von Fintel and Gillies [2008, 83] , they suggest that there is a further communicative impact of an utterance of a 'might'-sentence: "A might-claim is (pragmatically) more than just a profession of ignorance. By choosing a particular prejacent, the speaker is highlighting that possibility as one that should not be ignored." This is outside their discussion of dynamic semantics, but it is reasonable to conclude that they think such utterances have this impact regardless of the semantic account we choose. The Assertive Assumption: An assertive utterance of a 'might'-sentence at a context is just an assertion of its semantic content at the context.
Asserting is Checking:
Asserting at a context that p is consistent with the information of the context just is checking whether p is consistent with the information of the context. conveyed by an utterance of that sentence. After all, the linguistic data that we use as evidence for a semantic theory is data from conversations. And, it seems that in some context, an assertion of the semantic content will be the only speech act that is performed in uttering a sentence. If these pretty weak assumptions are right, then The Assertive Assumption holds for some context, 'might'-sentence pair.
There is also good reason to accept that Asserting is Checking is true for some contexts -in particular, contexts where the relevant information is the set of propositions that is common ground between the conversational participants. Suppose, for reductio, that Asserting is Checking is false for all contexts -that, for every context, asserting that a proposition is consistent with the What this means is that it must be consistent with what is common ground that the common ground is different than what it actually is. But it is reasonable to think that this can't be so. This is because it is plausible that when a group gains a piece of information, both this information and the information that the group has gained this information becomes common ground. If this is right, then our supposition must be false for that context -and, so, Asserting is Checking must be true for that context. Let's leave the classic story about 'might' that we inherit from modal logic to the side for now and focus, instead, on why we use conditional 'might'-sentences. 25 Why do we utter (1) when we do? The main reason is not to perform a check on the information of the context to see whether the proposition that Angelica is the thief is consistent with it. Rather, the main reason to utter (1) is to present Angelica's being the thief as a serious option in reasoning and deliberation about the question at hand. 26 So the typical purpose of uttering a 'might'-sentence is to present its prejacent 25 This is inspired by and analogous to the strategy pursued by Björnsson and Finlay [2010] for deontic modals. 26 This important insight is gaining popularity and is a major part of some of the new accounts of epistemic modals. Braun's [2012] account incorporates the idea that uses of 'might'-sentences are importantly linked to agents' taking propositions seriously. And Willer [2013, 50] says, "might-statements are designed to change possibilities that are merely compatible with the agent's evidence into 'live possibilities' -possibilities that are compatible with the agent's evidence and that the agent takes seriously in inquiry." The insight is also affirmed in Bach [2011, 57] : "When you use a bare EP sentence [simple 'might'-sentence] assertively, ordinarily you do not assert a mere idle possibility. If it is worth mentioning, presumably you take it to be a more serious possibility than that and intend it to be taken as such" and in von Fintel and Gillies [2008, 83] : "the speaker [of a 'might'-sentence] is highlighting that possibility as one that should not be ignored." And Stephenson [2007, 516] suggests something similar: "pragmatic factors typically require there to be some reason for bringing up a particular epistemic possibility, for example if there is reason to believe that it's fairly likely." I believe this sort of idea was first developed in the recent literature in Swanson [2006, section 2.3.2] . The most extensive historical discussion of this insight is found in Toulmin [1958] :
[I]n dealing with any sort of problem, there will be an initial stage at which we have to admit that a number of different suggestions are entitled to be considered. They must all, at this first stage be admitted as candidates for the title of 'solution', and to mark this we say of each of them, 'It may (or might) be the case that . . . .' At this stage, the term 'possibility' is properly at home, along with it's associated verbs, adjective and adverb: to speak of a particular suggestion as a possibility is to concede that it has the right to be considered.
[18] And:
In order for a suggestion to be a 'possibility' in any context, therefore, it must 'have what it takes' in as a serious option in reasoning and deliberation:
The Serious Option Theory of 'Might': Suppose p is the content of S in a context. Then an assertive utterance of ┌ It might be that S ┐ at that context typically conveys that p is a serious option in reasoning and deliberation. It is giving the condition on which that possibility should be taken seriously. 27 We use (2) for the primary purpose of presenting Angelica's being the thief as a serious option in reasoning and deliberation on the supposition that she has crumbs in her pocket.
The Serious Option
What exactly is it to be a serious option in reasoning and deliberation? I'll leave the issue of communication to the side for the next couple of paragraphs and say a bit about what it is that is communicated. The idea is this. When we reason and deliberate, we don't consider every open possibility and look to rule out each one. Given our cognitive limitations we can't do this.
Rather, we take some possibilities as privileged, or serious, in our reasoning. These are the ones order to be entitled to genuine consideration in that context. To say, in any field, 'Such-and-such is a possible answer to our question', is to say that, bearing in mind the nature of the problem concerned, such-and-such an answer deserves to be considered.
[37] Thanks to Jonathan Dancy for drawing my attention to Toulmin's work. 27 It may look like we are dealing with a relevance or biscuit conditional. However, (2) fails the standard tests for biscuit conditionals. It allows for the word 'then' to occur before the consequent. And it can be embedded under non-speech act verbs, like 'believes'. See Bhatt and Pancheva [2006] . (2) and Chuckie may take it as a serious option that Susie is the thief. But they don't take it as a serious option that George W. Bush is the thief even if they know they can't rule out the possibility that he is. In general, on this sort of picture, it matters how likely a possibility is.
There is a distinction between bare possibilities and serious possibilities. However, a possibility can go from bare to serious given some more information. It is possible that supposing some other proposition moves George W. Bush's being the thief from a mere possibility to a serious option for Tommy and Chuckie. This is both a natural characterization of how possibilities feature in reasoning and deliberation and exactly the sort of account we need to avoid the problem raised in the previous sections.
Here are two obvious candidate analyses of serious options. First, we could take a proposition to be a serious option just in case it has probability over some non-zero threshold. 28 A proposition may be below the threshold given some information, but it may rise above the threshold on some further supposition. The other sort of treatment uses a resource from Kratzer's [1981 Kratzer's [ , 1991 framework for giving the meaning of modals -the ordering source. This allows Kratzer to rank possibilities according to how serious they are. We could say that a proposition is a serious option just in case it is true in one of the worlds that is most highly ranked according to the ordering source. It could be that a proposition is false in all of the closest worlds, but that it is true in one of the closest worlds after taking on some supposition (in virtue of all of the worlds that were previously closest being inconsistent with the supposition). I won't decide between these views (or others) here, but it is interesting that the theorists who are closest to Kratzer -von Fintel and Gillies [2007 , 2008 (2), but not the corresponding simple sentence, like (1). The conversational scenarios in which it is appropriate to utter (2) and not (1) are of the following sort: they are scenarios in which it is not a serious option that Angelica is the thief -so an utterance of (1) is not appropriate -but it is a serious option that Angelica is the thief on the supposition that she has crumbs in her pocket -so an utterance of (2) is appropriate. In such a scenario, a speaker is not in the proper epistemic position to utter (1) but is in the proper epistemic position to utter (2). It is important to note that this is the same type of explanation that we gave for why we can sometimes utter non-modal conditionals, like (4), and not their consequents, like (3). That we can
give such an explanation is a major benefit of The Serious Option Theory of 'Might'.
Here are a few ways we could choose to flesh out this picture of 'might'-communication.
There are a number of different ways that a use of (1) could convey that it is a serious option that 29 Both Yalcin [2011] and Willer [2013] present fruitful formal models for treating possibilities in a fine-grained manner. The precise nature of these models need not concern us here. What is important is that as long as these models satisfy a demand that Yalcin and Willer set out, they cannot also model a natural conception of serious options. This is because they use the fine-grainedness to distinguish between propositions that an agent believes might be the case and those that are merely consistent with an agent's information. And, an agent can believe that a proposition might be the case without taking it as a serious option. For instance, I can believe that Paul Ryan might be the next president without taking it as a serious option that he is the next president. Since their models won't allow this, their models can't do both the work they require of them and represent serious options (See also Willer [note 10] for some other reasons against treating serious possibilities in Yalcin's manner). I want to be clear that this is not an argument against Yalcin's view, since he doesn't explicitly talk of serious options or say that he is trying to capture that notion. And Willer, though he is concerned with serious options, suggests an alternative way of treating believing that something might be the case, and on this alternative, we can make all of the desired distinctions.
Angelica is the thief. First, an utterance of (1) might be an assertion that it is a serious option that Angelica is the thief. Second, an utterance of (1) might offer a recommendation -one to take seriously the possibility that Angelica is the thief. 30 Third, an utterance of (1) might be an expression of some mental state of taking it as a serious option that Angelica is the thief. And there are natural conditional versions of each of these accounts to make sense of uses of sentences like (2). These proposals are subtly different -they have different advantages and disadvantages. 31
But what is important here is what they share -that the main communicative upshot of uttering
(1) has to do with treating Angelica's being the thief as a serious option in reasoning and deliberation.
All of these proposals for fleshing out The Serious Option Theory of 'Might' are, in principle, compatible with the idea that one function -perhaps the one encoded in the semantics -of uttering a 'might'-sentence is to perform a consistency check on the information of the context.
The Serious Option Theory of '
Might' is an account of one communicative impact of the utterance. It is possible that an utterance of a 'might'-sentence both performs a consistency check and conveys that the prejacent is a serious option. Indeed, there is a plausible explanation, given Grice's Maxim of Relation [1989] , of how these speech acts would fit together. Suppose a consistency 30 Montminy [2012] gives a fruitful theory on which a speaker who utters a 'might'-sentence typically weakly suggests the prejacent as an indirect speech act. I think this theory is compatible with The Serious Option Theory of 'Might' (as well as the cases, discussed below, where a speaker does not convey that the prejacent is a serious option). Also, a first approximation of the view developed Swanson [forthcoming] is that in assertively uttering a 'might'-sentence (indeed, for Swanson, any sentence), a speaker advises her addressee to be in a credal state that meets certain constraints (Swanson goes on to refine the view in ways that need not concern us here). 31 Some are better positioned to avoid other popular puzzles about 'might'-communication -in particular the disagreement puzzle developed in Egan, Hawthorne, and Weatherson [2005] and the supposition puzzle in Yalcin [2007] . These puzzles challenge contextualist theories of 'might'. If our theory of how we convey serious options is contextualist in the sense that speakers who use 'might'-sentences assert that some proposition is a serious option for some contextually determined individual or group, it will face these puzzles. Some have defended contextualism from these puzzles -see, in particular, Dowell [2011] for the first and Barnett [2009] for the second. Others may prefer to reject a contextualist account of how we convey serious options. They could say that we assert a relativist proposition -one that is true if and only if the proposition is a serious option for the assessor. Or they could take the recommendation or expression options that I sketched above. check is semantically encoded by 'might'-sentences. But, given that our purposes and cognitive capacities often require highlighting certain options for the correct answer to our question, simply performing a consistency check is not very relevant (after all there are many, many propositions that will pass such a check). What is relevant is noting which possibilities we think are plausible. Because of this, hearers can realize when a speaker, in a particular situation, is using a 'might'-sentence to present a serious option. In these situations the most important function of uses of 'might'-sentences is given by The Serious Option Theory of 'Might'.
As I mentioned after introducing The Serious Option Theory of 'Might', there are uses of 'might' that don't convey that the prejacent is a serious option in reasoning (in a way that is compatible with the Gricean-style explanation just given). More importantly, we don't encounter a recurrence of our central problem in either case.
Consider, first, the stressed uses of 'might'. I contend that we simply don't use stressed 'might'-sentences in the consequents of conditionals. Using these sentences is always inappropriate (Consider an anomalous utterance of "If Angelica has crumbs in her pocket, then she might be the thief"). So, we do, in these stressed cases, get the prediction that I've been discussing throughout the paper -that it is at least as appropriate to utter a simple 'might'-sentence as the corresponding conditional. But we don't have a problem because the prediction about these cases is true.
The appropriate exo-centric uses of conditional 'might'-sentences involve a mixing of epistemic positions. For instance, Lil can say (as an aside to someone else), "If he hasn't figured out yet that it's a PT boat, then, yeah, there might be a battleship on C4." But here, the antecedent is supposed relative to Lil's information and the consequent is relative to Phil's.
Because different bodies of information are at issue (unlike in standard cases like (If Cookies)), our assumptions won't generate the false prediction.
Thus, these non-typical uses of 'might', while taking away from the generality of The Serious Option Theory of 'Might', are not problematic. I have assumed that there are exactly two sorts of non-typical uses. If there are other uses that don't convey that the prejacent is a serious option, I incur the debt of explaining why we don't encounter the problem of the false prediction in these cases. But, I know of no reason to think that there are other uses of this sort. So it is reasonable to conclude that The Serious Option Theory of 'Might' explains all the cases in which it is appropriate to utter a conditional 'might'-sentence but not the corresponding simple one.
In this section I suggested that we typically use 'might'-sentences to convey that the prejacent is a serious option in reasoning and deliberation. And we use conditional 'might'-sentences to convey that the prejacent is a serious option under some supposition. We've seen that this view allows us to avoid the problem that The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might' leads to.
I've also suggested a few different ways to implement The Serious Option Theory of 'Might', as a first step toward giving a complete theory of 'might'-communication. I think exploring this framework will show that it makes good sense of our talk about uncertainty, though there is not space to carry out that exploration here. 33
33 It is often thought to be a desideratum of accounts of 'might' and conditionals that "If S, then it might be that T" and "It might be that S and T" (where the modal takes wide scope) are true in exactly the same scenarios. See, for example, Gillies [2010] . But, according to The Serious Option Theory of 'Might' , a typical use of latter conveys something stronger than a typical use of the former. This is because, where p is the content of S and q is the content of T, a use of "It might be that S and T" typically conveys p and q (and presumably each proposition by itself) as a serious option while a use of "If S, then it might be that T" typically conveys only that p is an open possibility (however distant) and q is a serious option, on the supposition of p. While Gillies's equivalence may be true of the semantics of 'might' and conditionals, the pragmatic predictions of The Serious Option Theory of 'Might' are, indeed, correct. Consider the following adaptation of (If Cookies*): (If Cookies**) Tommy: Susie and Stu are serious suspects. But, given our information, we shouldn't now consider Angelica a serious suspect. Chuckie: # Yes, but Angelica might be the thief and have crumbs in her pocket. (If Cookies**) is no more appropriate than (If Cookies*) -adding another conjunct under the scope of the modal does nothing to increase appropriateness. So, (If Cookies) and (If Cookies**) stand in the same relationship that (If Cookies) and (If Cookies*) do. That is, (If Cookies) and (If Cookies**) constitute a pair of conversations which show that the pragmatic prediction of The Serious Option Theory of 'Might' is correct. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for urging me to address this issue.
Conclusion
In this paper, I showed that The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might' and Conditional 'Might'- Sentences predict that it is always at least as appropriate to utter a simple 'might'-sentence as the corresponding conditional. But, this prediction is false. I suggested that the root of the problem is The Consistency Checking Theory of 'Might'. I closed by sketching an alternative view about what assertive uses of 'might'-sentences typically do -one that avoids making the false prediction.
These uses typically present the prejacent as a serious option in reasoning and deliberation. In the end, I conclude that this view might be the right view of 'might '-communication 
